Why the Engineering Model Is Inadequate as a Criterion of Efficacy in the Humanities

In recent years, the claim that the humanities are not applied and therefore must be made applicable to solving societal problems has become increasingly prominent in academic and policy debates. This claim is most often advanced by administrators and policymakers whose understanding of knowledge production is shaped by an engineering model of science. Within this model, research is expected to move linearly from basic inquiry to technical application and measurable problem solving. When this framework is imposed on the humanities, it produces policies and research agendas that fail to grasp their epistemic character and social function.

This article argues, through an epistemological analysis, that the widespread perception of the humanities as non applied rests on an idealized and reductionist conception of science. The engineering model presupposes a privileged relationship between basic sciences and engineering sciences and treats application as the primary criterion of relevance. Because the humanities do not conform to this structure, they are judged ineffective or irrelevant. The article maintains that this judgment results not from an inherent deficiency in the humanities, but from the inappropriate projection of a model designed for technical disciplines onto interpretive forms of knowledge.

Drawing on philosophical analysis and selected case studies, the article explores alternative models that challenge the dominance of the engineering paradigm while offering new ways of understanding the relationship between the humanities and application. Two such models are examined. The first is Bent Flyvbjerg’s concept of phronetic social science, which critiques social engineering and proposes a form of relevance grounded in practical wisdom, contextual judgment, and value oriented inquiry. The second is Hanson’s criterion of fit with practice, which questions conventional classifications of the natural and human sciences and criticizes the instrumentalization of the humanities.

Both models introduce philosophical concepts that reconfigure how application is understood in relation to the humanities. Phronetic social science emphasizes dialogical rationality and field based inquiry, while the criterion of fit with practice proposes a gradational understanding of applicability and highlights methodological pluralism. Together, these approaches demonstrate that the contribution of the humanities to social life cannot be adequately assessed in contemporary policy contexts.