A Consideration of Hegel’s Philosophy According to Popper and to the Neo-Popperian Inversion Theory of Truth

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Independent Researcher, USA

10.22034/jpiut.2026.21264

Abstract

This paper shows how Hegel’s misconception of truth and knowledge misled his ideas of Absolute spirit, dialectically reinforced dogmatism and irrational historicism toward his disastrous conclusion of a “totalitarian playbook”. Analysis by Hegel scholars is presented and contrasted with Popper’s Critical Rationalism-based critiques. Hegel held a version of Correspondence for everyday truth plus a deeper “philosophical” truth, similar to essence, which could be unified with consciousness. This is compared to Popper’s anti-essentialism. Hegel’s dialectical theory is contrasted to Popper’s falsificationism. Popper showed that dialectical method produced historical relativism. Hegel’s Philosophy of Identity, yielding the dialectical Idealism of “what is reasonable must be real”, led to “might is right” with emergence of nations by fighting for domination on the stage of history. Popper credited Hegel with formulating the “playbook of totalitarianism”, used lethally by followers of Hegelian Left and Right. Inversion Theory claims the word “true”, implying completeness, certainty, and self-consistency, is applicable only to the objective world. Perception of it, acquired by an evolved biological process (Active Subjectivism), incorporates essential falsehood, yielding “best knowledge” of reality. It solves problems related to the regulatory, statistical, evidentiary, inconstant and even indexical nature of knowledge. Only the Inversion theory exposes the errors of dialecticism: since it involves subjective concepts, it is impossible for a true synthesis plus its negative antithesis to give a true synthesis. The historical process of the Zeitgeist contains falsehood, the cunning of reason to move the spirit forward is uncertain, and nobody can perform the truth for their time. 

Keywords

References

Alznauer, M. (2023.) Untrue concepts in Hegel’s logic. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 61(1) Jan. ohn Hopkins University Press, pp. 103-126. Project MUSE. https:///doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0004
Bielenberg, A. P. (2021). Jan 25. alioshabielenberg.com Accessed September 8, 2024
Caird, E. (1968). Hegel. Hamden, New Haven, CT. Archon Books. Chapter 1
Evans, L. (2021). Hegel on history. Philosophy Now, Jul 27. https://philosophynow.org/issues/129/Hegel_on_History
Giladi, T. M. (2022). Hegel’s truth: A property of things? Hegel Bulletin, 43(2):267-277. https:///doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2022.7
James, D. (2007). Hegel; A Guide for the Perplexed. London. Continuum International Publishing Group.
Lugten, P. (2024). An evaluation of Kant’s transcendental idealism using the inversion theory of truth. Journal of Philosophical Investigations, 17(45), 159-174. https:///doi.org/10.22034/JPIUT.2023.57752.3578
Miolli, G. (2018). Hegel’s theory of truth as a theory of self-knowledge. Hegel-Jahrbuch, Vol 11. No 1, pp 128-133 https:///doi.org/10.1515/hgjb-2018-110124
Pinkard, T. (2001). Hegel: A Biography. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
Pinkard, T. (2017). Does History Make Sense? Hegel on the Historical Shapes of Justice. Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press.
Plant, R. (1999). Hegel. The Great Philosophers series. NewYork. Routledge.
Popper, K. R. (1944). The Poverty of Historicism. Revised 1957. London. Routledge.
Popper, K. R. (1945) The Open Society and its Enemies: Volume 2. Revised 1963. Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press.
Popper, K. R. (1963). Conjectures and Refutations. London. Routledge.
Popper, K. R. (1972). Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach.Oxford. Oxford University Press.
Taylor, C. (1975). Hegel. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
Send comment about this article
CAPTCHA Image
Journal of Philosophical Investigations
Volume 20, Issue 54 - Serial Number 54
Articles
Issue 54, Spring 2026
February 2026
Pages 587-604

Files

Share

How to cite

Statistics