In Kant's point of view, we need a third thing as a mediating between predicate and subject in synthetic judgments. This issue about synthetic judgment a priori is a puzzle, because this judgment is not empirical and we can not use empirical intuition as a mediate thing in it. So, the third thing in this case must be pure and a priori. It's pure intuition of time. Time in imagination has two functions; first, when it combine pure concepts and empirical intuitions and second, when it make synthetic judgment a priori possible. In this paper I want justify this matter.
MAHOOZI, R. (2010). The third thing in synthetic judgment a priori in Kant's Philosophy. Journal of Philosophical Investigations, 3(214), 89-104.
MLA
MAHOOZI, R. . "The third thing in synthetic judgment a priori in Kant's Philosophy", Journal of Philosophical Investigations, 3, 214, 2010, 89-104.
HARVARD
MAHOOZI, R. (2010). 'The third thing in synthetic judgment a priori in Kant's Philosophy', Journal of Philosophical Investigations, 3(214), pp. 89-104.
CHICAGO
R. MAHOOZI, "The third thing in synthetic judgment a priori in Kant's Philosophy," Journal of Philosophical Investigations, 3 214 (2010): 89-104,
VANCOUVER
MAHOOZI, R. The third thing in synthetic judgment a priori in Kant's Philosophy. Journal of Philosophical Investigations, 2010; 3(214): 89-104.
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