A Study of the Possibility of a Science Associated with a Specific Worldview

Mostafa Taqavi

Assistant Professor, philosophy of science, Sharif University of Technology,

E-mail: m_taqavi@sharif.edu

Abstract

There are two main sections in this paper. First, we will show that some of the chief 20th-century theories of science either have failed to demonstrate that value judgments do not influence the context of consolidation and determination of science or have accepted the role of value judgments in the context of consolidation and determination of science and theorized accordingly. For this purpose, the ideas of logical positivists, Willard Quine, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, and Roy Bhaskar on science are briefly reviewed. Finally, the validity of the following statement will be explored: if ‘science is influenced by cognitive-normative foundations of A’ then ‘the science based on cognitive-normative foundations of, say, B is possible.’ Subsequently, the following question will be contemplated: is pluralism in Cognitive-normative foundations accepted methodologically? In this way, the final section includes ratification of the possibility of science associated with a particular worldview and goes on to explain the issues important in the argument in favor of such science.

Key Words: science associated with a particular worldview, Context of Consolidation and Determination of Science, Cognitive-Normative Foundations, Value Judgments, possibility

1- Introduction

Reviewing the ideas of Ayer, Quine, Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend and Bhaskar, the current essay have shown that key schools of philosophy of science in the twentieth century either have failed to demonstrate that science is free from values in the contexts of constitution and determination or have officially announced that values are involved in both contexts.

The claim that "values play a role in the contexts of constitution and determination of science" implies that science may take form in various contexts of subjective features in different ways and this is to say that values play their roles in the formation of the ontology of theory. Since logic only determines the valid forms of argument and whereas observation is theory- laden although they can play a role in the constitution and determination of science they are not still sufficient for perfect constitution and determination of science and thus cognitive presumptions the selection of which is influenced by values are involved in the formation of theory and its selection out of the existing alternative theories.

2- Value Free Science: Myth or Reality?

2-1- Separating Metaphysics from Science

Logical positivists seriously sought to demonstrate that metaphysics is separate from the domain of science and value judgments cannot make their way into science.

2-2- Epistemological Holism

Quine by raising an argument against the analytic-synthetic dualism and by his thesis of epistemological holism questioned the idea of Logical Positivists. By suggesting the thesis of the under determination of theory based on empirical evidence Quine showed that choosing from among the alternative theories is not merely possible with logical observation as an objective criterion and thus we can conclude that a room is cleared for the inclusion of the value judgments.

2-3- Meaningfulness and Benefit of Metaphysics

Likewise, Popper not only has not considered metaphysics to be meaningless in his criticisms of Logical Positivism rather he regards it to be useful for science. By the expression of the allegory of particles suspended in a fluid Popper demonstrates that science may have its origin in metaphysical ideas. Popper believes that the context of discovery of theory is influenced by metaphysical and value systems but he also contends that by the continuation of the criticism science gradually becomes purified of its contextual features.

2-4- A Judgment Influenced by World Two

Popper distinguishes between three different worlds in relation to the human experience. The content of Popper's World Three grows via the continuation of scientific creative and critical activity – as revealed through Popper's tetradic scheme – and scientific theories become closer to the truth. Whether error elimination activity or criticism in Popper is free from value judgments? The foundations of Popper's philosophy of science do not imply that criticism is free from value judgments. Of course, this is not a conclusion that would be welcomed by Popper.

2-5- Science as a Common Property of a Group of Human Beings  

Kuhn established a theory for science that recognized and highlighted the role of value judgments in constitution and determination of science. His theory of science questioned the objective rationality of science and its progressive nature. To know the science, according to Kuhn, we need to know the common properties of the people who produce science and apply it.

2-6- Methodology of Scientific Research Programs: A Path towards Rationality

Lakatos reacts to Kuhn's relativism and struggles to provide a theory for science which offers a rational picture of science. However, his methodology actually does not set any methodological conditions for the practice of the scientists and they are allowed to do scientific activity under the influence of their value judgments.

2-7- Free Society: Premise of Development of Science

Feyerabend does not consider science to be objective and does not regard this rationality to be superior to the rationality of other cognitive traditions. He believes that the only path of the betterment of the condition of science is the establishment of a free society where scientists are not forced to observe any methodological norms and so-called rational rules. He recommends the scientists to be free to creatively develop and defend their method and theory under the influence of any value system they like.

2-8- A Realist Theory of Science

Bhaskar contrary to Kuhn and Feyerabend who are chiefly focused on the transitive dimension of science pays attention to both transitive and intransitive dimensions of science and establishes a theory for science in view of both. In Bhaskar's theory, metaphorical thinking plays a significant role in scientific theorization and experimental activity; metaphorical thinking that is fed by the culture of society. Bhaskar considers science to represent a reality independent from the subject and at the same time he regards it as a social phenomenon the transitive aspect of which emerges under the influence of social values.

3- Science Associated with a Specific World-view: Study of Relevant Issues

The prevalent science in time might be evaluated and it would become clear that it is influenced by specific normative-cognitive foundations which have their names and origin. For example, some scholars have shown that contemporary science is under the influence of the naturalistic world view and value system. Now the question is this: whether we can conclude "science founded on normative-cognitive foundations B is possible" based on the statement that "contemporary science is influenced by normative-cognitive foundations A"?

3-1- Problem of Possibility

If the worldview W uses its own specific components in the constitution of normative-cognitive foundations of science and at the same time none of the constitutive components of these foundations is consistent with the worldview W, we can speak of the science associated with the worldview W. Nevertheless, assessment of realization of such a relationship between science and worldview is only possible by the occurrence of science. Science should take place so that we can assess this relationship and it may take so many years and even centuries that such a science becomes realized. However, we can still speak of the scientific research program founded on worldview W.

3-2- Is pluralism in normative-cognitive foundations a desirable methodological principle? 

A methodologist might announce given the difference in type and scale of the fertility of foundations that pluralism in normative-cognitive foundations is a desirable methodological principle. Here one needs to ask: if the proponent of the science associated with a specific worldview wants to produce a science-based on his own worldview in a space where every group produces the science-based on its worldview?! Or not, he believes that it is only the science-based on his worldview that can uncover truth?! In the first case, the proponent of such a science should accept a relativistic space but in the second case, he must be able to justify the normative-cognitive foundations resulted from his own worldview objectively.

4- Conclusion

According to the definition that has been offered in the section 3-1 regarding science associated with a specific worldview this science is identifiable via hindsight. Nevertheless, we can speak of a hopeful research program the goal of which is the production of science-based on a specific worldview.

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