Journal of Philosophical Investigations

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Professor of Philosophy at University of Melbourne: Melbourne, Victoria, Australia

Abstract

This paper advocates a realist position with respect to science and common sense. It considers the question of whether science provides knowledge of reality. It presents a positive response to that question. It rejects the anti-realist claim that we are unable to acquire knowledge of reality in favour of the realist view that science yields knowledge of the external world. But it remains to be specified just what world that is. Some argue that science leads to the rejection of our commonsense view of the world. If so, the world about which science informs us is not the world of common sense. Common sense is “stone-age metaphysics”. It is false theory inherited from our primitive ancestors that is to be eliminated in favour of science. Against such an elimination of common sense, it is argued that science both preserves and explains our commonsense experience of the world. Science may well lead to the overthrow of some of our most deeply held beliefs. But common sense reflects a more basic and durable level of experience. Commonsense beliefs are well-confirmed beliefs that are vindicated by their role in successful practical action each and every day. Common sense provides a firm basis on which to base a realist philosophy of science.

Keywords

Alspector-Kelly, M. (2004). Seeing the Unobservable: Van Fraassen and the Limits of Experience, Synthese, 140(3), 331-353. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000031323.19904.45
Campbell, K. (1988). Philosophy and Common Sense, Philosophy, 63, 161-74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230223134
Devitt, M. (2002). A Naturalistic Defence of Realism in the Problem of Realism, Edited by M. Marsonet, Ashgate.
Eddington, Sir A.S. (1933). The Nature of the Physical World, Cambridge University Press.
Hoyningen-Huene, P. (1993). Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas Kuhn’s Philosophy of Science, University of Chicago Press.
Kitcher, P. (2001). Real Realism: The Galilean Strategy, the Philosophical Review, 110(2), 151-97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-110-2-151
Kuhn, T. S. (1996). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed, University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn, T. S. (2001). The Road Since Structure in The Road Since Structure, Edited by J. Conant and J. Haugeland, University of Chicago Press.
Magnus, P. D. (2003). Success, Truth and the Galilean Strategy, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 54(3), 465-474.
Quine, W.V.O. (1969). Natural Kinds in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University Press.
Stich, S. (1990). The Fragmentation of Reason, MIT Press.
van Fraassen, B. (1980). The Scientific Image, Oxford University Press.
CAPTCHA Image