Document Type : Research Paper

Author

• Seyedmahmoud yousofsani

Faculty member of Iranian Institute of Philosophy

Abstract

The external and internal cognitive powers of animals each have their own specific perceptions. But sometimes, along with the specific object of each cognitive power, other perceived things that have not been directly perceived by any of the cognitive powers at the moment of perceiving a specific object are also comprehended. Avicenna referred to this type of perceptions, especially when they are of the kind of sensible objects, as "incidental sensible" and regarded the faculty that perceives them as the faculty of estimation. Since the faculty of estimation perceives "intentions" which are in opposition to entities known as "forms," which are exclusively perceived by external senses, the question arises as to how the estimation, which perceives intentions, can comprehend external perceptions if incidental perceptions are of the same kind as sensibles, and incidental sensibles are indeed forms. The answer is that the position of a perceptual object in terms of form or intention is not an absolute position, but is determined by the relationships and ratios established between the perceived and the perceiver in a specific perceptual act. And for this reason, Avicenna defined intentions not by the characteristic of being non-sensory, but by the feature of "not being perceived through external senses."

Keywords

• form"
• . "
• intention"
• incidental sensible"
• incidental perception"
• faculty of estimation"
• "
• Avicenna"

Main Subjects

• philosophy